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We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...
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Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011813890
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Over the past few decades, matching models, which use mathematical frameworks to analyze allocation mechanisms for heterogeneous products and individuals, have attracted renewed attention in both theoretical and applied economics. These models have been used in many contexts, from labor markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014481577
We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195331
Hedonic pricing with quasilinear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318563
We construct a matching model on the marriage market along more than one characteristic, where individuals have preferences over physical attractiveness (proxied by anthropometric characteristics) and market and household productivity of potential mates (proxied by socioeconomic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269642
We develop a two-sided matching model with positive sorting, divorce and remarriage. Match quality for each couple is revealed ex post and those with poor draws divorce. Competition determines lifetime expected utilities but per-period utilities depend on the laws that govern the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272030