We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

Scarf's algorithm [18] provides fractional core elements for NTU-games. Biró and Fleiner [3] showed that Scarf …'s algorithm can be extended for capacitated NTU-games. In this setting agents can be involved in more than one coalition at a time … show that if a stable allocation yielded by the Scarf algorithm turns outto be integral then it provides a stable matching …

satisfy RGSP, but is only necessary for the Top Trading Cycles rule. For the allocation of divisible private goods among …

for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both … the players and their possible cooperations can have capacities. We show that the problem of finding a stable allocation … interpretation of these results for matching games. Finally we consider an even more general setting where players' contributions in …