We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

potential partners but also over what other matches occur. Once such externalities are considered, the set of stable matchings …

characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings …

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is … strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show … result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply …

We study a labor markets described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm …