Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic...

Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic...

We propose a solution to the trade-off between Pareto efficiency and stability in matching markets. We define a matching to be essentially stable if any claim initiates a chain of reassignments that ultimately results in the initial claimant losing the object she claimed to a third agent. Our...

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...