Similar Search Results

Consistency and its converse for roommate markets

Klaus, Bettina - 2013

For marriage markets with equal numbers of men and women and where all men find all women acceptable and all women find … all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … marriage markets by adding individual rationality and by replacing anonymity with gender fairness. We generalize both results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222181

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Mauleon, Ana; Vergote, Wouter - 2008

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219020

Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642

Pairing games and markets

Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435

Many-to-one matching : externalities and stability

Salgado, Alfredo - 2020

all possible matches. Finally, we analyze a notion of the core and its relation with the set of stable assignments. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195202

Stability in Matching With Couples Having Responsive Preferences

Khare, Shashwat - 2018

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a stable matching may fail to exist even when both couples and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907657

Marriage Formation With Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem

Parilina, Elena - 2013

In this paper, we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with … characteristics. We show that individuals with a higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081052