We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all...

We study matching policies in a dynamic exchange market with random compatibility, in which some agents are easier to match than others. In steady state this asymmetry creates an endogenous imbalance: hard-to-match agents wait for partners, while easy-to-match agents can match almost immediately...

We study how to optimally match agents in a dynamic market with heterogeneous match values. A network topology determines the feasible matches in the market. We consider networks that are two-sided when all matches include two agents, or acyclic otherwise. An inherent trade-off arises between...

"The NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health provides summaries of publications like this. You can sign up to receive the NBER Bulletin on Aging and Health by email. As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include...