Random matching models with a continuum population are widely used in economics to study environments where agents interact in small coalitions. This paper provides foundations to such models. In particular, the paper establishes an existence result for random matchings that are universal in the...

We consider a two-player game in which one player can take a costly action (i.e., to provide a favor) that is benefcial to the other. The game is infnitely repeated and each player is equally likely to be the one who can provide the favor in each period. In this context, equality matching is...

We simplify the stability notion for the two-sided, one-to-one matching setting in distributional form of Greinecker and Kah (2021). Their stability notion uses the product measure of a matching with itself and requires a certain ``instability'' set to be null. In contrast, our definition of...

We introduce a model of large many-to-one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our...