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Optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem with two-dimensional types

Hoeksma, Ruben; Uetz, Marc - In: Operations research 64 (2016) 6, pp. 1438-1450

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011620696

Optimal design for multi-item auctions : a robust optimization approach

Bandi, Chaithanya; Bertsimas, Dimitris - In: Mathematics of operations research 39 (2014) 4, pp. 1012-1038

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462176

Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets

Hirai, Hiroshi; Sato, Ryosuke - In: Mathematics of operations research 47 (2022) 1, pp. 259-285

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013364862

On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem

Duives, Jelle; Heydenreich, Birgit; Mishra, Debasis; … - In: Journal of scheduling 18 (2015) 1, pp. 45-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481999

Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - In: Journal of mathematical economics 82 (2019), pp. 202-213

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105839

Algorithmic mechanism design with investment

Akbarpour, Mohammad; Kominers, Scott Duke; Li, Kevin Michael - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 91 (2023) 6, pp. 1969-2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014438251

Designing fair tiebreak mechanisms : the case of FIFA penalty shootouts

Anbarcı, Nejat; Sun, Ching-Jen; Ünver, M. Utku - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011293850

Designing fair tiebreak mechanisms : the case of FIFA penalty shootouts

Anbarcı, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301194

Approximately optimal mechanisms for strategyproof facility location : minimizing Lp norm of costs

Feigenbaum, Itai; Sethuraman, Jay; Ye, Chun - In: Mathematics of operations research 42 (2017) 2, pp. 434-447

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684443

Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints

Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2017

This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697514