Recent empirical studies conclude that small firms have higher but more variable growth rates than large firms. To explore the effect of this size-dependence regularity on moral hazard and investment, we develop a continuous-time agency model with time-varying firm size. Firm size is a diffusion...

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

This paper investigates the optimal management of supply disruptions by a manufacturer who uses order inflation and/or investments in process reliability when contracting two risk-averse suppliers. We consider that these investments can be subject to moral hazard. Technically we solve a...

Consider a setting in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent, and unobservable to the principal, unless the principal is monitoring the agent. Monitoring ensures effort but is costly to...

This paper studies optimal task assignments in a setting where agents are expectation-based loss averse according to KoszegiRabin (2006) and KoszegiRabin (2007) and are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure in which tasks are technologically independent. We show that the...

We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing - or of even foreseeing - the possible states of nature in advance. We argue, however, that...