We challenge the global optimality of one-shot punishments in infinitely repeated games with discounting. Specifically, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by investigating tacit collusion in the infinite repetition of...

I/B/E/S removes 6% of one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts from the calculation of the consensus forecast. This study examines managers' role in these removals. We show optimistic forecasts are removed more often than pessimistic forecasts, after controlling for removal policies that I/B/E/S...

In this paper we suggest a new efficient technique for solving integer knapsack problems. Our algorithms can be seen as application of Fast Fourier Transform to generating functions of integer polytopes. Using this approach, it is possible to count the number of boolean solutions of a single...

We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...

Consensus estimates, formed by taking an average of analyst forecasts, play an important role in capital markets (e.g., provide investors with a proxy for earnings expectations). We show I/B/E/S, a prominent information intermediary, removes 6% of one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts before...

Markets for natural resources and commodities are often oligopolistic. In these markets, production capacities are key for strategic interaction between the oligopolists. We analyze how different market structures influence oligopolistic capacity investments and thereby affect supply, prices and...

We model a market, such as an online software market, in which an intermediary connects sellers and buyers by displaying sellers' products. With two vertically-differentiated products, an intermediary can place either: (1) one product, not necessarily the better one, on the first page, and the...