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Optimal information disclosure : a linear programming approach

Kolotilin, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 607-635

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702

Optimal Information Disclosure : A Linear Programming Approach

Kolotilin, Anton - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012979703

A Tenure-Clock Problem

Chen, Chia-hui - 2015

and hidden information, where the principal must induce the agent to exert effort to facilitate her learning process. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030521

Policy Gradient Methods for the Noisy Linear Quadratic Regulator over a Finite Horizon

Hambly, Ben M.; Xu, Renyuan; Yang, Huining - 2021

We explore reinforcement learning methods for finding the optimal policy in the linear quadratic regulator (LQR …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251559

Optimism and Communication

Chen, Ying - 2010

I examine how the communication incentive of an agent (sender) changes when the prior of the principal (receiver) about the agent's private information becomes more optimistic (in the sense of monotone likelihood ratio dominance). I use the canonical model of strategic communication (Crawford...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190361

Optimal Multiattribute Screening

Weber, Thomas A. - 2016

We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978605

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2009

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199987

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Bergemann, Dirk; Välimäki, Juuso - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215953

Chapter 10. Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets

Golosov, M.; Tsyvinski, A.; Werquin, N. - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 2, v. 2A-2B SET, (pp. 725-841). 2016

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287

Genetic algorithms and economic evolution

Riechmann, Thomas - 1998

This paper tries to connect the theory of genetic algorithm (GA) learning to evolutionary game theory. It is shown that … economic learning via genetic algorithms can be described as a specific form of evolutionary game. It will be pointed out that … GA learning results in a series of near Nash equilibria which during the learning process build up to finally reach a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526540