arranged marriage. First, we show that this individual never opts out of a voluntarily agreed upon marriage. Second, we … demonstrate that our marrying individual uses a reservation utility to determine which marriage proposal to accept. Third, we … marriage market in which there are many identical marrying individuals and profit maximizing matchmaking firms. We show that …

arranged marriage. First, we show that this individual never opts out of a voluntarily agreed upon marriage. Second, we … demonstrate that our marrying individual uses a reservation utility to determine which marriage proposal to accept. Third, we … marriage market in which there are many identical marrying individuals and profit maximizing matchmaking firms. We show that …

This paper presents a tractable framework for studying frictionless matching in school, work, and marriage when … communicate and coordinate at lower resource cost. The theory delivers full task specialization in the labor and education markets …, but incomplete specialization in marriage. It also captures well-known matching patterns in each of these sectors …

This paper presents a tractable framework for studying frictionless matching in school, work, and marriage when … communicate and coordinate at lower resource cost. The theory delivers full task specialization in the labor and education markets …, but incomplete specialization in marriage. It also captures well-known matching patterns in each of these sectors …

This paper presents a tractable framework for studying frictionless matching in school, work, and marriage when … communicate and coordinate at lower resource cost. The theory delivers full task specialization in the labor and education markets …, but incomplete specialization in marriage. It also captures well-known matching patterns in each of these sectors …