From a variant of Kuhn's triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an epsilon-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces epsilon toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations

Although evidence accrues in biology, anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species, the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner (as in Nash and Walrasian equilibrium). I here postulate a cooperative kind of...

The main objects here are Nash equilibria in spatial Cournot oligopolies when profits depend on coordinated distribution. Production is non-cooperative, but the subsequent transportation must be performed jointly to minimize costs. Cournot-Nash equilibria for this two-stage game with partial...

We discuss a few supply chain design concepts and optimization models that have been applied in the energy sector. It is not our intention to provide a comprehensive review of the vast literature. Our goal is to provide the reader with pointers to some interesting and challenging problems,...

In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...