In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically … challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we describe two real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop … different applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or college admissions with …

-allocating agency are encoded as edge weights in the acceptability graph. The welfare of an allocation is the sum of its edge weights …. We introduce the constrained welfare-maximizing solution, which is the allocation of highest welfare among the Pareto …-world instance of kindergarten allocation and large-scale simulated instances. Incentives to report preferences truthfully are …

We study a natural generalization of the maximum weight many-to-one matching problem. We are given an undirected … maximum weight many-to-one matching satisfying two sets of constraints: vertices in A are incident to at most one matching … edge, while vertices in P are either unmatched or they are incident to a number of matching edges between their lower and …

This paper contains two results. The first result says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a … balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result says that given any efficient non …-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together …