We study a robust version of the single-unit auction problem. The auctioneer has confidence in her estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but does not have reliable information about the joint distribution. In this setting, we analyze the performance of...

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function,...

Dieser Beitrag bietet eine Einführung in eine Gruppe moderner Algorithmen, den sogenannten evolutionären Optimierungsverfahren. Anhand eines einfachen Beispiels wird die grundsätzliche Funktionsweise dieser Algorithmen skizziert. Darüberhinaus wird ein Überblick über die...

The paper presents an extended version of the consumer choice problem. Different from the standard model, prices are not fixed but arise from Walrasian interactions of total demand and a stylized supply function for each of the goods. Three different types of evolutionary algorithms are set up...