We study the problem of how to allocate a set of indivisible objects like jobs or houses and an amount of money among a group of people as fairly and as efficiently as possible. A particular constraint for such an allocation is that every person should be assigned with the same number of objects...

The paper, by providing example of an efficient liability assignment rule under which liabilities of interacting parties for accidental losses is not always coupled, demonstrates that decoupling is not entirely inconsistent with efficient assignment of liabilities

This paper contains two results. The first result says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on...

In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends...