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We analyze optimal compensation schedules for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and producing the same good but serving geographically differentiated markets. Since the outcome of each director depends on his own effort and on a random variable representing market...
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—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive formulations allow us to reduce often complex models to a sequence of essentially … of the basic theory: the Revelation Principle, formulating and simplifying the incentive constraints, using promised … advanced topics: duality theory and Lagrange multiplier techniques, models with lack of commitment, and martingale methods in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
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Purpose: We aim to generalize the continuous-time principal-agent problem to incorporate time-inconsistent utility functions, such as those of mean-variance type, which are prevalent in risk management and finance. Design/methodology/approach: We use recent advancements of the Pontryagin maximum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015163486
We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978605
I examine how the communication incentive of an agent (sender) changes when the prior of the principal (receiver) about the agent's private information becomes more optimistic (in the sense of monotone likelihood ratio dominance). I use the canonical model of strategic communication (Crawford...
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