We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to one for stochastic games with observable states and public (but not necessarily perfect) monitoring when the limiting set of (long-run players') equilibrium payoffs is independent of...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the...

Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. Often these situations are strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the determinants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We run a...

In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...

In this note we consider the static output feedback linear quadratic control problem. We present both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this problem has a solution in case the involved cost depend only on the output and control variables. This result is used to present both...

In this article we address the problem of finding feedback Nash equilibria for linear quadratic differential games defined on descriptor systems. First, we decouple the dynamic and algebraic parts of a descriptor system using canonical projectors. We discuss the effects of feedback on the...

We bring together the theories of duality and dynamic programming. We show that the dual of a separable dynamic optimization problem can be recursively decomposed. We provide a dual version of the principle of optimality and give conditions under which the dual Bellman operator is a contraction...

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...