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Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts

Chen, Mingliu - 2020

Consider a setting in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent, and unobservable to the principal, unless the principal is monitoring the agent. Monitoring ensures effort but is costly to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853741

Optimal management of supply disruptions when contracting with unreliable, risk-averse, suppliers

Parlane, Sarah; Tsai, Yingyi - 2017

/or investments in process reliability when contracting two risk-averse suppliers. We consider that these investments can be subject …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665554

The Impact of Firm Size on Dynamic Incentives and Investment

Chi, Chang Koo - 2019

Recent empirical studies conclude that small firms have higher but more variable growth rates than large firms. To explore the effect of this size-dependence regularity on moral hazard and investment, we develop a continuous-time agency model with time-varying firm size. Firm size is a diffusion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905816

Chapter 10. Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets

Golosov, M.; Tsyvinski, A.; Werquin, N. - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 2, v. 2A-2B SET, (pp. 725-841). 2016

international economics featuring incomplete risk sharing can be analyzed using the tools of the theory of recursive contracts. …In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of …—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive formulations allow us to reduce often complex models to a sequence of essentially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287

Optimal Task Assignments with Loss-Averse Agents

Balmaceda, Felipe - 2018

This paper studies optimal task assignments in a setting where agents are expectation-based loss averse according to KoszegiRabin (2006) and KoszegiRabin (2007) and are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure in which tasks are technologically independent. We show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927853