In this paper an algorithm is proposed to find an integral solution of (nonlinear) complementarity problems. The algorithm starts with a nonnegative integral point and generates a unique sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying dimension. Conditions are stated under which the algorithm...

This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game, and provides an elementary proof that a Nash...

We propose a computationally feasible way of deriving the identified features of models with multiple equilibria in pure or mixed strategies. It is shown that in the case of Shapley regular normal form games, the identified set is characterized by the inclusion of the true data distribution...

We present a new way to solve generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We assume the feasible set to be compact. Furthermore all functions are assumed to be polynomials. However we do not need any convexity assumptions on either the utility functions or the action sets. The key idea is to use...

Conventional data envelopment analysis (DEA) for measuring the relative efficiency of a set of decision-making units (DMUs) requires the observations to have precise values. When observations are imprecise and represented by interval values, the efficiencies are also expected to reflect interval...

The sum of a supermodular function, assumed nondecreasing in the choice variable, and of a 'concavely supermodularizable' function, assumed nonincreasing in the parameter variable, satisfies the Milgrom- Shannon (1994, Monotone comparative statics, Econometrica 62, 157-180) single crossing...

We study the existence problem of a zero point of a function defined on a finite set of elements of the integer lattice of the n-dimensional Euclidean space. It is assumed that the set is integrally convex, which implies that the convex hull of the set can be subdivided in simplices such that...

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...

We describe a 3-person, 2-cut envy-free cake-cutting algorithm, inspired by a continuous moving-knife procedure, that does not require that the players continuously move knifes across the cake. By having the players submit their value functions over the cake to a referee—rather than move...