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A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems

Kotowski, Maciej H. - 2020

Many two-sided matching situations involve multiperiod interaction. Traditional cooperative solutions, such as … about the future and a robust evaluation of contemporaneous outcomes. A perfect a-stable matching exists, even when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849277

Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints

Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 2, pp. 481-509

This study investigates efficient and strategy‐proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415273

Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201

Optimizing for Distributional Goals in School Choice Problems

Bodoh-Creed, Aaron - 2017

I investigate three goals of school choice: student welfare, encouraging neighborhood schools, and diversity. I develop a framework for finding the optimal match for any combination of these objectives while respecting stability and incentive compatibility. I then apply my framework to data from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950942

Assignment Maximization

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz - 2020

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it implies incentive, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first are Pareto efficient, and undominated –...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853755

Welfare Theorems for Random Assignments with Priorities

Schlegel, Jan Christoph - 2020

We provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853378

Equivalence of Efficiency Notions for Ordinal Assignment Problems

Cho, Wonki Jo - 2016

In ordinal (probabilistic) assignment problems, each agent reports his preference rankings over objects and receives a lottery defined over those objects. A common efficiency notion, sd-efficiency, is obtained by extending the preference rankings to preferences over lotteries by means of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993968

Becker Meets Ricardo : Multisector Matching with Social and Cognitive Skills

McCann, Robert - 2012

This paper presents a tractable framework for studying frictionless matching in school, work, and marriage when … communicate and coordinate at lower resource cost. The theory delivers full task specialization in the labor and education markets …, but incomplete specialization in marriage. It also captures well-known matching patterns in each of these sectors …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107170

Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems

Ágoston, Kolos Csaba; Biró, Péter; McBride, Iain - 2016

We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits, the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011562748

Stable project allocation under distributional constraints

Ágoston, Kolos Csaba; Biró, Péter; Szántó, Richárd - 2017

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010799