An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...

I/B/E/S removes 6% of one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts from the calculation of the consensus forecast. This study examines managers' role in these removals. We show optimistic forecasts are removed more often than pessimistic forecasts, after controlling for removal policies that I/B/E/S...

Consensus estimates, formed by taking an average of analyst forecasts, play an important role in capital markets (e.g., provide investors with a proxy for earnings expectations). We show I/B/E/S, a prominent information intermediary, removes 6% of one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts before...

We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...

We aim to determine an optimal stock selling time to minimize the expectation of the square error between the selling price and the global maximum price over a given period. Assuming that stock price follows the geometric Brownian motion, we formulate the problem as an optimal stopping time...