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Merger mechanisms
Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - 2004
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599056
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Internal financing, managerial compensation and multiple tasks
Brusco, Sandro; Panunzi, Fausto - In: Annals of finance 16 (2020) 4, pp. 501-527
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012496423
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Merger Mechanisms
Brusco, Sandro; Viswanathan, S.; Lopomo, Giuseppe - 2008
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073457
Cover Image
Merger Mechanisms
Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - 2004
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm's stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324884
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Merger Mechanisms
Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423148