We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way … they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for … colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal …

auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The theoretical model predicts that with risk neutral agents all sales take … place in the auction rendering the negotiation prior to the auction obsolete. An experimental test of the model provides …

' assessments of capacity scarcity. Under symmetric and risk-neutral suppliers, the two auction formats yield the same expected … procurement cost for buyers, but the discriminatory auction results in substantially lower price variance. When suppliers are risk …

rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated. We propose a new open clock auction for this … procurement problem. This auction is strategically simple, as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex …-post rationality, while observing the budget constraint. We test the auction in Monte-Carlo simulation and discuss its applicability …