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We revisit the idea that robustness concerns can provide a foundation for simple mechanisms. Formally, we consider the robust implementation notion of continuous implementation (Oury and Tercieux, 2012), where continuity is with respect to players' hierarchy of beliefs. We define simplicity as...
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A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal can costly verify agents' private signals. The...
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We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel...
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