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Top monotonicity : a root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - In: Games and economic behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 345-359

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009373114

Top monotonicity : a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826141

Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness

Berga Colom, Dolors; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, … - In: Economics letters 181 (2019), pp. 199-202

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012121807

Voting under constraints

Barberà, Salvador - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 2, pp. 298-321

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001229227

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Social choice and welfare 16 (1999) 2, pp. 321-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001364041

Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Games and economic behavior 25 (1998) 2, pp. 272-291

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001379572

Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-Proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - 2008

We characterize the maximal sets of preferences under which generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof. Those domains are defined by a qualified version of single-peakedness, which depends on the distribution of power among agents implied by each generalized median voter scheme

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202538