Similar Search Results

Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness

Berga Colom, Dolors; Correa-Lopera, Guadalupe; Moreno, … - In: Economics letters 181 (2019), pp. 199-202

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012121807

Top monotonicity : a root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - In: Games and economic behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 345-359

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009373114

Top monotonicity : a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826141

Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes

Berga Colom, Dolors - In: Social choice and welfare 19 (2002) 1, pp. 175-192

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001656350

Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good

Berga Colom, Dolors; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Journal of economic theory 90 (2000) 1, pp. 39-61

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001448186

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Hatsumi, Kentaro; Berga Colom, Dolors; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 1, pp. 153-168

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336542

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Hatsumi, Kantaro; Berga Colom, Dolors; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2011 - This version: March 23, 2011

Following Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008988868

A Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof and No-Vetoer Rules in the Multi-Object Choice Model

Hatsumi, Kentaro - 2013

Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093515

Voting under constraints

Barberà, Salvador - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 2, pp. 298-321

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001229227

Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Social choice and welfare 16 (1999) 2, pp. 321-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001364041