Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The...

Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The...

We provide a new explanation for a profitable horizontal merger between Cournot oligopolists with symmetric constant returns to scale technologies and homogeneous goods. We show that a merger can be profitable if it prevents a foreign firm from undertaking FDI. Our result is due to the effect of...

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to...

This article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry. We give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to Pareto-improving vertical integration and...

Vertical integration followed by quantity competition is studied. In the first stage of the game downstream firms simultaneously decide whether to integrate with one of the upstream suppliers. If firms are not able to observe whether their vertically integrated competitor enters the...

Theoretical and empirical research in the past decades has advanced our understanding of what determines the vertical boundary of a firm. An equally important but much less understood issue is the impacts of vertical integration on firm performance, mainly because the decision on vertical...

Most mergers filed at the enforcement agencies are conglomerate in nature with only minor horizontal overlaps. An enforcement agency may challenge the merger, if any overlap is believed to be adversely affected by the transaction. While the merging firm is entitled to a hearing in federal court,...

Should mergers among nonprofi t organizations be assessed diff erently than mergers among for-profit firms? A recent debate in law and economics, boosted by apparently one-sided court decisions, has produced the result that promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular...