Using merger documents filed with the SEC from 1994 to 2018, we show that being selected by investment banks as “comparable peers” are more than twice as likely to become a target themselves in the future compared to control firms matched for industry and size. They also experience an...

Takeover bidders in stock-for-stock mergers have strong incentives to increase their own pre-merger stock prices to lower their acquisition costs. We find that before announcements of stock mergers, bidders manage down analyst earnings forecasts prior to earnings releases. Such expectation...

We examine whether, how, and why acquirer shareholder voting matters. We show that acquirers with low institutional ownership, high deal risk, and high agency costs are more likely to bypass shareholder voting. Such acquirers have lower announcement returns and make higher offers than those who...

Using unique data, this paper examines investment banks’ choice of peers in comparable companies analysis in mergers and acquisitions. We find strong evidence that product market space is amongst the most important factors in peer selection, but we provide evidence indicating that Standard...

We evaluate the over-valuation hypothesis and merger arbitrage price pressure hypothesis as potential explanations for the observed negative returns to stock acquirers around merger announcement. Using daily shorting flow data, we show that the majority of the negative announcement returns can...