The efficiency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream consequences of the efficiency defence should equally be considered, namely the improvement of the distribution of notified mergers through the...

This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers control by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more...

The efficiency defence was long delayed in the European merger control due to costly implementation issues. In this paper we argue that the upstream consequences of the efficiency defence should equally be considered, namely the improvement of the distribution of notified mergers through the...

This paper examines the optimal use of remedies and the efficiency defense for merger control. We develop a framework in which merger efficiency gains are endogenously determined and are not observed by the Competition Authority. The possibility of an efficiency defense can push firms to design...

This paper aims to contribute to the normative economic analysis of mergers by taking into account the possible efficiency gains for the design of structural merger remedies. We show that a larger asset transfer should be requested from a less efficient merged firm than from a more efficient...

This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust, given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms in terms of...