We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in its first decade. Probit estimates indicate the impact of career experience on dissent voting is negligible, whereas the impact of forecast inflation is pronounced. In addition to finding a role for...

We extend Harris and Zhao (2007) by proposing a (Panel) Inflated Ordered Probit model, and demonstrate its usefulness by applying it to Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee voting data.

We consider the estimation of the standard errors of individual-specific parameters calculated ex post from a non-linear random parameters model. Our key contribution lies in introducing a simple method of appropriately calculating these standard errors, which explicitly takes into account the...

In 1997, the Bank of England was granted operational responsibility for setting interest rates to meet a Government inflation target of RPIX 2.5 percent. As part of the shift towards independence, operational decisions on monetary policy were delegated to a Monetary Policy Committee. Using...

Building on Blinder and Wyplosz (2005) this paper presents a formal mechanism which potentially explains how autocratically collegiate, genuinely collegiate and individualistic monetary policy committees (MPCs) are able to reach a consensus. Drawing on the theory of Markov chains, I adopt a...

I examine the propensity of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (BoEMPC) members to cast dissenting votes. In particular, I compare the type and frequency of dissenting votes cast by socalled insiders (members of the committee chosen from within the ranks of bank staff) and outsiders...

We extend Harris and Zhao (2007) by proposing a (Panel) Inflated Ordered Probit model, and demonstrate its usefulness by applying it to Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee voting data.