An Independent Central Bank is often associated with being able to achieve low inflation and greater output stability than government run policies. In this paper we examine whether, and under what circumstances, an independent Central Bank can achieve both these targets with only one policy...

The research work presented below addresses the possible concern of central bank independence through the development and application of econometric models. The complexity of the modelling has allowed a step further in corroborating that financial independence is not only linked to the...

This paper analyzes the pillar of the modern central bank governance – independence – offering three contributions. After a systematic review of the economics of central bank independence, a principal agent model is used to design a political economy framework, which explains how the...

We study the monetary instrument problem in a model of optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policy. The policy problem is cast as a dynamic game between the central bank, the fiscal authority, and the private sector. We show that, as long as there is a conflict of interest between the two...