Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot co- ordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple...

This paper investigates the stabilization bias that arises in a model of monetary and fiscal policy stabilization of the economy, when assuming that the monetary authority put higher weight on inflation stabilization than society. We demonstrate that inflation-conservatism unambiguously leads to...

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy-maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in...

This paper develops the theoretical framework and studies discretionary non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy stabilisation in a New Keynesian model, where the fiscal policymaker uses distortionary taxes as the policy instrument and operates with long periods between optimal adjustments of...

In this paper we study the degree of precommitment that is required to eliminate multiplicity of policy equilibria, which arise if the policy maker acts under pure discretion. We apply a framework developed by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debortoli and Nunes (2010) to a standard New...