The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v....

Frank Easterbrook's 1984 article, The Limits of Antitrust, did not focus on public antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, it expressed the kind of antitrust thinking that led the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, around the same time, to shift its resources to cartel...

Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing has had theoretical importance for antitrust law far out of proportion to the trivial dispute it resolved. It has divided adherents of the Chicago and Post-Chicago Schools, providing a useful vehicle for considering the proper goals of antitrust. And it has...

In a 2013 opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James Robart calculated “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or RAND royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for licenses to use Motorola patents that were essential to two industry standards. Although the case involved only a...

This article, published in 2001, considers the appropriate standards for monopolization cases in which the defendant has allegedly reduced innovation by refusing to deal with the plaintiffs. We note that claims of reduced innovation are problematic, particularly in dynamic markets, because...

The Antitrust Division’s Microsoft case and the Federal Trade Commission’s Intel case both rested on claims that antitrust intervention was necessary to preserve innovation in technological platforms at the heart of the personal computer. Yet, because those very platforms support markets...