This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator, abatement effort made by the monopoly and social welfare comparing two alternative policy games. The first game assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the emission...

The so-called excess-entry theorem (Mankiw and Whinston 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987) establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournotoligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalise the approach and analyse the behaviour of a...

The authors explain why the elementary logic of rate-of-return regulation generates not the competitive outcome but the monopoly outcome. Within the framework of the "passive regulator" that this logic entails, public regulation cannot alter the monopoly outcome, but can only change the form in...

This paper analyses whether scale economies exists in the UK telecommunications industry. The approach employed differs from other UK studies in that panel data for a range of companies is used. This increases the number of observations and thus allows potentially for more robust tests for...

This paper evaluates the effects of the lack of regulatory commitment on emission tax applied by the regulator, abatement effort made by the monopoly and social welfare comparing two alternative policy games. The first game assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the emission...

The internet giants - Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google, among others - have transformed society with both positive and negative effects. The negative effects have been stark. There have been huge disruptions caused by e-commerce. More recently, subtler, but even more serious negative effects...

This paper shows with a formal model that under monopoly regulation, OPEX-risk can be a source for a CAPEX-bias. If OPEX and CAPEX are substitutes, the regulated firm can reduce the risk of the firm and thereby reduce the true cost of capital by rebalancing OPEX and CAPEX. If the allowed...

This paper studies the pricing incentives of a monopolist constrained by a revenue cap endogenously determined by her costs in a so-called base year. Such regulation is employed, among others, to govern electricity distribution operators in Germany. We show that the revenue cap may incentivize...

In this paper we systematically study the vertical integration and sabotage decisions of a regulated bottleneck monopoly that sells access to independent downstream firms. Our results reconciliate a set of seemingly contradictory findings of the literature. We show that unless the monopoly's...

This paper studies the role of taxation in durable good markets with dynamic monopolies. By conditioning the marginal tax rate on the volume of trade, the social planner can provide incentives for the monopolist to abandon sequential screening and clear the market immediately in unique...