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Killing the bearer of ill tidings : a theory of consensus-provision moral hazard

Boot, Arnoud W. A.; Milbourn, Todd; Thakor, Anjan V. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000986122

Investment "myopia" and the internal organization of capital allocation decisions

Thakor, Anjan V. - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 6 (1990) 1, pp. 129-154

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001136347

Moral hazard and information sharing : a model of financial information gathering agencies

Cornett, Marcia Millon - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 40 (1985) 5, pp. 1403-1422

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001006996

Firm-specific human capital and optimal capital structure

Jaggia, Priscilla B. - In: International economic review 35 (1994) 2, pp. 283-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001164425

Is fairly priced deposit insurance possible?

Chan, Yuk-shee - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 47 (1992) 1, pp. 227-245

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001124509

Secured lending and default risk : equilibrium analysis, policy implications and empirical results

Boot, Arnoud W. A. - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 101 (1991) 406, pp. 458-472

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001125727

Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information

Chan, Yuk-shee - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 42 (1987) 2, pp. 345-363

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001047783

Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game

Boot, Arnoud W. A. - In: International economic review 35 (1994) 4, pp. 899-920

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001172628

The valuation of assets under moral hazard

Ramakrishnan, Ram T. S.; Thakor, Anjan V. - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 39 (1984) 1, pp. 229-238

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002672604

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting

Acharya, Viral V. - 2015

We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk-shifting. However, faced with socially-costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038182