Since the global financial crisis of 2007, regulators and economists have analysed the moral hazards inherent in institutional arrangements which encouraged economic actors to act irresponsibly. The process of institutional reform must extend to review of legal rules which allow transacting...

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die geplante und zum Teil schon verwirklichte Reform des Gesetzes über Arbeitnehmererfindungen (ArbEG). Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen die Vergütungen, die Arbeitgeber an einen Mitarbeiter zu zahlen haben, wenn sie dessen Erfindung in Anspruch nehmen. Bisher wurde...

Dieser Beitrag analysiert die geplante und zum Teil schon verwirklichte Reform des Gesetzes über Arbeitnehmererfindungen (ArbEG). Im Mittelpunkt der Analyse stehen die Vergütungen, die Arbeitgeber an einen Mitarbeiter zu zahlen haben, wenn sie dessen Erfindung in Anspruch nehmen. Bisher wurde...

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...

We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...

In liability lawsuits (e.g. patent infringement) a plaintiff demands compensation from a defendant and the parties often negotiate a settlement to avoid a costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for the defendant in this settlement negotiation. We study the characteristics...

This article presents empirical estimates that two thirds of the people perceive breach of contract followed by compensation for the promisee as not immoral. In the absence of compensation, it reveals that most individuals perceive the moral value of breach depending on the consequences thereof,...

In many contracts that deal with the division of future quantities, there is a tension between risk-sharing aspects and incentive aspects. Over the last twenty-five there has been relatively more attention paid to these incentive aspects, particularly moral hazard. In this paper, we point out...

We investigate the optimal regulation of energy production reflecting the long-term goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. We analyze the optimal regulatory incentives to foster the development of non-emissive electricity generation when the demand for power is served either by a monopoly or by...