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Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?

Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 40 (1999) 3, pp. 275-294

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001453854

Regulating broiler contracts : tournaments versus fixed performance standards

Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C.; Vukina, Tomislav - In: American journal of agricultural economics 83 (2001) 4, pp. 1062-1073

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001633616

Contests to become CEO : incentives, selection and handicaps

Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C.; Knoeber, Charles Robert; … - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 30 (2007) 2, pp. 195-221

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003419711

Bailing out conflicted sovereigns

Calomiris, Charles W.; Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C. - In: Journal of financial intermediation 51 (2022), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013401652

Regulating Broiler Contracts : Tournaments Versus Fixed Performance Standards

Tsoulouhas, Theofanis C.; Vukina, Tom - 2001

Grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers. This paper focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to prevent integrator companies from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014139633

Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard

Biglaiser, Gary - In: Journal of economic theory 61 (1993) 2, pp. 302-330

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001157083

Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

Tsoulouhas, Theofanis; Knoeber, Charles; Agrawal, Anup - In: Economic Theory 30 (2007) 2, pp. 195-221

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370750