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Contract theory in the spotlight : Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström, 2016 Nobel Prize winners

Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 4, pp. 493-533

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943020

How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance

Wynant, Luc; Manigart, Sophie; Collewaert, Veroniek - In: Venture capital : an international journal of … 25 (2023) 2, pp. 135-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299460

Complete contracts under incomplete information

Curello, Gregorio; Lyu, Qianjun; Zhang, Yimeng - 2024

We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the principal's incentive to provide information. While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135462

Control and contract design in research collaborations : a complete contract perspective

Panico, Claudio - In: International journal of industrial organization 30 (2012) 5, pp. 459-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658141

Relational contracts in a persistent environment

Kwon, Suehyun - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 61 (2016) 1, pp. 183-205

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011480024

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105

Impatience versus incentives

Opp, Marcus M.; Zhu, John Y. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 83 (2015) 4, pp. 1601-1617

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405089

Contracts, incentives and organizations : Hart and Holmström Nobel Laureates

Smirnov, Vladimir; Wait, Andrew - In: Review of political economy 29 (2017) 4, pp. 493-522

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882413

Nitpicky insurers and the law of contracts

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre M. - 2017

that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … costlessly observable, then it should be included in the contract to improve the risk sharing-incentive trade-off under moral … resulting incompleteness of the contract opens the door to controversies and disputes that may lead to judicial procedures. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471

Self-enforcing contracts with persistence

Dumav, Martin; Fuchs, William; Lee, Jang-woo - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012798311