Showing 1 - 10 of 2,605
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high … contract is misspecified, i.e., when he is offered the robust contract, but his true effort cost is constant. I find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905754
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796
principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides … the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where … he receives excessive benefits compared to the contract without ambiguity, while after low performance, he enters the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009427192
I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. The principal commits, while the agent's type evolution follows a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901976
In this paper, we show that whenever the agent's outside option is nonzero, the optimal contract in the continuous …. The agent is then asked to resume effort, and the contract continues. We show that a nonzero agent's outside option arises …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854897
The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO-approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a …-optimal contract if the frequency of interactions is sufficiently high (or equivalently if the discount factor, time horizon and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158852
preponderance-of-the-evidence to determine whether the agent acted in accordance with the contract. In the second method, the court … adopts a substantive approach, treating the original contract as incomplete, thus rendering a decision based on what it … believes the parties would have agreed upon had they been able to complete the contract ahead of time. From an efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015396893