We develop a model with two asymmetric countries. Firms choose the number and the location of plants that they operate. The production of each firm increases when trade costs fall. The fall also induces multinationals to repatriate their production into a single country, which is likely to be...

We develop a model with two asymmetric countries. Firms choose the number andthe location of plants that they operate. The production of each firm increases whentrade costs fall. The fall also induces multinationals to repatriate their production intoa single country, which is likely to be the...

We develop a model with two asymmetric countries. Firms choose the number and the location of plants that they operate. The production of each firm increases when trade costs fall. The fall also induces multinationals to repatriate their production into a single country, which is likely to be...

We develop a model with two asymmetric countries. Firms choose the number and the location of plants that they operate. The production of each firm increases when trade costs fall. The fall also induces multinationals to repatriate their production into a single country, which is likely to be...

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms’ organizational structure, andconsumers’ utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-basedprofit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve...

We investigate the spatial distribution and organization of an imperfectly competitive industry when firms may choose to operate more than a single production unit. Focusing on a short-run setting with a fixed mass of firms, we fully characterize the spatial equilibria analytically. Comparing...