Similar Search Results

On the maximal number of Nash equilibria in an n x n bimatrix game

Keiding, Hans - In: Games and economic behavior 21 (1997) 1, pp. 148-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001232538

Dynamic implementation of competitive equilibria in renegotiation proof equilibrium

Keiding, Hans - In: Equilibrium, markets and dynamics : essays in honour of …, (pp. 77-89). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001681434

Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium : a complete characterization

Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001421244

Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus

Fristrup, Peter; Keiding, Hans - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 2, pp. 213-226

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001571436

Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium : a complete characterization

Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel - In: Social choice and welfare 19 (2002) 2, pp. 241-263

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001662844

On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms

Abdou, J.; Keiding, Hans - In: Mathematical social sciences 46 (2003) 3, pp. 243-260

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001845758

Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

Abdou, J.; Keiding, Hans - In: Journal of mathematical economics 45 (2009) 11, pp. 708-719

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937612

Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

Abdou, J. (contributor); Keiding, Hans (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003691189

Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

Abdou, Joseph; Keiding, Hans - HAL - 2009

We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic gameform using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011025909

Interaction sheaves on continuous domains

Abdou, Joseph; Keiding, Hans - HAL - 2008

We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750768