In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into markets one by one, the prices of any...

In an exchange economy under uncertainty with two periods, one physical good, and finitely many states of the world, we show that for every (complete or incomplete) market span there exists a sequence of securities such that if they are introduced into markets one by one, the prices of any...

Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...

We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993). In every one of 24 rounds 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...

Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...