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Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486886
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Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011628386
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Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590455
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Non-revelation mechanisms for manyto-many matching : equilibria versus stability
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590504
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Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 222-229
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793353
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Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: Economics letters 144 (2016), pp. 98-101
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011617215
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When bidding more is not enough : all-pay auctions with handicaps
Feess, Eberhard (contributor);  … - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001825484
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Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare
Jaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Çagatay; Klijn, Flip - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2013
This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010763862
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Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Jaramillo, Paula; Kayı, Çaǧatay; Klijn, Flip - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 693-701
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049696
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Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare
Jaramillo, Paula; Kayi, Çagatay; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013
This paper studies many-to-one matching markets where each student is assigned to a hospital. Each hospital has possibly multiple positions and responsive preferences. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019698