In this paper we propose a mechanism to resolve King Solomon’s dilemma about allocating an indivisible good at no cost to the participating agents. A distinctive feature of our mechanism is the design of a two-part contest that makes the agents guess each other’s bids in a...

This paper considers self-stipulated penalties for defection and rewards for cooperation as inducements to cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma. The paper explicitly characterizes penalties and rewards that are necessary and suffcient to induce the players to cooperate. The characterization...

We consider bargaining problems with compact star-shaped choice sets arising from a class of economic bargaining environments. Convex or comprehensive (relative to the disagreement point) problems are star-shaped but not conversely. We characterize single-valued solutions satisfying the Nash...

We introduce log-convexity for bargaining problems. With the requirement of some basic regularity conditions, log-convexity is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Nash's axioms to determine a unique single-valued bargaining solution up to choices of bargaining powers. Specifically, we show...