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Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2023 - Revised version, October 2023

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise …-pay auction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380413

The n-player Hirshleifer contest

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2020

noise. In pure strategies, any asymmetric equilibrium corresponds to one-sided dominance, but there is also a variety of … in cut-throat competition, while any others become ultimately inactive. Of some conceptual interest is the observation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012267940

The n-player Hirshleifer contest

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2022 - Revised version, October 2022

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive … limit, equilibria in the Hirshleifer contest converge to equilibria in the corresponding all-pay auction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013440075

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2014

In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rent-dissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499802

Sorting in iterated incumbency contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2016

This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569559

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict

Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771

Foundations for Contest Success Functions

Corchón, Luis C.; Dahm, Matthias - 2008

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the 'type' of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217464

Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest : uniqueness and characterization

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2018

The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824432

Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in 2-Contestant Generalized Lottery Colonel Blotto Games

Li, Xinmi; Zheng, Jie - 2022

dominance relationship is impossible between any two distinct equilibria. Furthermore, we provide two sets of sufficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322722