This paper develops a strategy for identification and estimation of complete information games that does not require a regressor that has large support or a parametric specification for the distribution of the unobservables. The identification result uses a nonstandard but plausible condition on...

This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium with general best-reply functions. Our...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private domestic or foreign firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp...

This note presents a simple algorithm for characterizing the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a broad class of entry games. The algorithm alleviates much of the computational burden associated with recently developed econometric techniques for estimating payoff functions inferred from...

This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an...

Friendship is commonly assumed to reduce strategic uncertainty and enhance tacit coordination. However, this assumption has never been tested across two opposite poles of coordination involving either strategic complementarity or substitutability. We had participants interact with friends or...

Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering,...