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Bös, Dieter - 2002

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total … departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The … antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514012

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2014 - Revised version: May 5, 2014

This paper studies a large class of imperfectly discriminating contests, referred to as elastic contests, that induce players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360312

Equilibrium existence in group contests

Brookins, Philip; Ryvkin, Dmitry - In: Economic theory bulletin 4 (2016) 2, pp. 265-276

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011641950

Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints

Pastine, Ivan; Pastine, Tuvana - In: Economic theory 75 (2023) 4, pp. 983-1007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259084

The n-player Hirshleifer contest

Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2023 - Revised version, October 2023

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as considered by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014380413

Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests

Ewerhart, Christian - 2014

Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 R ∞") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360029

Rent-seeking games and the all-pay auction

Ewerhart, Christian - 2015

This paper considers rent-seeking games in which a small percentage change in a player's bid has a large percentage impact on her odds of winning, i.e., on the ratio of her respective probabilities of winning and losing. An example is the Tullock contest with a high R. The analysis provides a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472556

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2014

In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rent-dissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499802

Sorting in iterated incumbency contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - 2016

This paper analyzes iterated incumbency contests with heterogeneous valuations in a large population setting. Incumbents repeatedly face different challengers, holding on to their positions until defeated in a contest. Defeated incumbents turn into challengers until they win a contest against an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569559