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Revealed preference theory is a powerful tool for testing models of individual choice. It is now being extended to collective choice models as well. In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014086148
This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game, and provides an elementary proof that a Nash...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014024500
Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making by running both one-shot and repeated...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013092278
We introduce and analyze three definitions of equilibrium for finite extensive games with imperfect information and ambiguity averse players. In a setting where players' preferences are represented by maxmin expected utility, as characterized in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), our definitions...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013064382
schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014219141
players in a two - and three - member coalition in terms of the payoffs. It turns out that in a sequential equilibrium, these … associated with different coalition sizes and structures so that honesty and cheating do matter in this sense …
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014222767
The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013242607
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014029312