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Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria

Barelli, Paulo - In: Games and economic behavior 67 (2009) 2, pp. 363-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003909184

Competition for a majority

Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert - 2013 - Rev. April 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772242

A note on the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games

Barelli, Paulo; Meneghel, Idione - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 81 (2013) 2, pp. 813-824

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752290

A note on semi-Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games

Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Journal of economic theory 151 (2014), pp. 596-604

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010389538

Competition for a majority

Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 82 (2014) 1, pp. 271-314

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404641

A note on the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games

Barelli, Paulo; Soza, Idione - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009563433

Competition for a majority

Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578712

Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions

Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Journal of economic theory 155 (2015), pp. 95-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326862

Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs

Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Games and economic behavior 94 (2015), pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574873

Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information : dispensing with public randomization

Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1221-1248

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806463